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Neither for, nor against Mao: 
PCI-CCP interactions and the normalisation of Sino-Italian Relations,  
1966-71 
 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the Italian Communist Party (PCI)’s interactions 
with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the years immediately preceding the 
normalisation of Sino-Italian relations. The present work highlights three aspects 
of this dynamic: the PCI’s rewriting of its identity as a foreign policy making 
actor independent of the US, the USSR, and neither dismissive nor laudatory of 
Mao; the PCI’s establishment of partnerships with actors at home and abroad to 
allow for its China-policy blueprints to come to fruition; and the efforts of PCI-
affiliated intellectuals toward making a rapprochement between the PCI and the 
CCP possible. 
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Introduction 
In March 1963, the editors of Red Flag Magazine (Hongqi, 红旗) issued ‘More 
on the Differences Regarding Comrade Togliatti and Us’, assessing Palmiro 
Togliatti’s report to the 10th Congress of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). At 
the time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) organ took issue with Togliatti’s 
use of Marxist-Leninist phraseology, allegedly employed to downplay his 
substitution of notions such as ‘class struggle’ and ‘proletarian revolution’ with 
‘new ideas’ (xin gainian, 新概念 ) of ‘class collaboration’ and ‘structural 
reform’. 1  Togliatti was also accused of invoking the advent of a ‘peaceful 
competition’ between socialist countries and the bourgeois ruling classes for the 
‘establishment of an economic and social order capable of satisfying all the 
aspirations of men’, thereby excluding the need for a ‘people’s revolution’ to 
occur anywhere in Europe. 2 Lastly, Togliatti was blamed for arguing that the 
existing contradictions between imperialist countries could be harmonized 
through the establishment of ‘organic commercial and economic alliances among 
groups of states’– a statement clearly hinting at the economic reforms that Europe 
would undertake in the name of greater integration a decade later. 3  
Unsurprisingly, Togliatti’s ideas were labelled ‘undecided and unclear’ (moleng,
模棱 ) at best, ‘preposterous’ (huangmiu, 荒谬 ) at worst. What the Chinese 
nomenklatura failed to predict, however, was that the PCI’s partial departurefrom 
Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy would contribute to the normalisation of Sino-Italian 
relations. 4 By neither eulogizing nor antagonizing Maoist China, it is here argued 
that the Italian Communists helped bring Beijing closer to Rome – a first step 
                                                 
1The Editorial Department of Hongqi [Red Flag], Zai lun Taoliyadi tongshi yu women de fenqi – guanyu 
Liening zhuyi zai dangdai de ruogan zhongda wenti [More on the differences between comrade Togliatti and 
us – Some important problems of Leninism in the contemporary world] (Beijing, 1963), 13-14. 
2
 Ibid., 15. 
3
 Ibid., 18-19. 
4
 Sylvia Sprigge, ‘De-Stalinization in the Italian communist party’, The World Today, 18, no. 1 (1962), 23-9. 
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toward transforming Sino-Italian relations into a testing ground for China’s 
broader engagement with the Western world.  
The theme of Sino-Italian ties at the height of the Cold War has attracted 
the attention of historians Ennio Di Nolfo and Enrico Fardella, who have moved 
beyond the ‘bipolar paradigm’ to study the Cold War as a complex network of 
relations between major and minor powers.5 Fardella in particular has explored 
the normalisation of Sino-Italian ties by looking at China’s interactions with the 
Italian government between 1968 and 1970, later expanding the scope of his 
research to cover almost the entire duration of the Cold War (1949-1989).6 The 
risk of solely focusing on the inter-governmental dimension of Sino-Italian 
relations, however, implies overlooking inter-communist party ties – a channel 
through which a communist single-party regime would interact with its political 
counterparts abroad, instead of having to deal solely with right-wing (and 
potentially hostile) governing parties. This has led historians to focus on the 
autonomous role that the PCI played in forging contemporary Italian foreign 
policy. 
Works focused on the extra-European dimension of the PCI’s 
international relations include analyses of the impact of the Italian Communists 
on the decolonisation of Africa and their relationship with the Middle East and 
North Africa region, Cuba, and North Vietnam. 7 Among those who have paid 
attention to the PCI’s ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Marco 
Galeazzi has offered an overview of the PCI’s engagement with Beijing, but only 
within the broader context of Italy’s relations with the countries of the Non-
                                                 
5
 Ennio Di Nolfo, La Normalizzazione delle Relazioni Diplomatiche tra la Repubblica Italiana e la 
Repubblica Popolare Cinese (Rubbettino: Soveria Mannelli, 2010), 1-58; Enrico Fardella, “The 
Normalization of Relations between Italy and the People’s Republic of China,” in Italy’s Encounters with 
Modern China: Civilizational Exchanges, Imperial Dreams, Strategic Ambitions, eds. Giovanni B. 
Andornino and Maurizio Marinelli (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014), 117-46. 
6
 Enrico Fardella, “A Significant Periphery of the Cold War: Italy-China Bilateral Relations, 1949-1989,” 
Cold War History 2 no. 17 (2016): 181-197. 
7
 Paolo Borruso, Il PCI e l’Indipendenza Africana. Apogeo e Crisi di un’Utopia Socialista (Florence: Le 
Monnier, 2009); Luca Riccardi, Il “Problema Israele”: Diplomazia Italiana e PCI di Fronte allo Stato 
Ebraico (1948-1973) (Rome: GueriniStudio, 2006); Onofrio Pappagallo, Il PCI e la Rivoluzione Cubana. La 
“Via Latino-Americana al Socialismo” tra Mosca e Pechino, 1959-1965 (Roma: Carocci, 2009). 
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Aligned Movement (NAM). 8  With a more substantial focus on China alone, 
Guido Samarani and Sofia Graziani have explored the evolution of PCI-CCP ties, 
albeit not extending their research beyond the 1949-1965 timeframe.9   
 These works testify that a significant number of documents from PCI 
archives have already been included in the historiography. None of the 
aforementioned works, however, has examined primary sources documenting 
PCI-CCP relations in the years immediately preceding the normalisation of Sino-
Italian ties. This was a time of great historical relevance, however, as it witnessed 
the completion of the first cycle of the Cultural Revolution in the PRC and the 
relative decay of the Centre-Left in Italy – a background against which the PCI, 
as it is shown, attempted to implement its own PRC-focused foreign policy 
blueprints.10 
The present work is divided into three sections. While section one 
examines the PCI’s initial attempts at formulating an autonomous foreign policy 
targeting China, section two assesses how the PCI moved from theory to action, 
implementing a foreign policy strategy that could bring the Italian Communists 
closer to Kim Il-sung’s Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), while engaging with 
Italian Prime Minister (PM) Aldo Moro and the leftist-leaning current of the 
Christian Democracy (DC), known as Sinistra di Base, at the domestic level. The 
third and last section of this paper examines the contribution of lower-ranking 
actors within the PCI to the initial phase of the normalisation of Sino-Italian ties, 
making a contribution to our understanding of this relationship away from works 
which have mainly focused on the actions of individual, high-ranking PCI Central 
Committee (CC) members and their attitudes toward China.  
 
                                                 
8
 Marco Galeazzi, Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi Non Allineati, 1955-1975 (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2011). 
9
 Guido Samarani and Sofia Graziani, ‘Yidali gongchandang yu Zhonghua renmin gongheguo: zhengzhi 
lianxi yu jiaoliu, 1949-1965’ [The Italian Communist Party and the People’s Republic of China: political ties 
and exchanges, 1949-1965], Lengzhan guoji shi yanjiu [Cold War International History Studies], 1 (2015): 5-
29. 
10Marie-Claire Bergère, La Cina dal 1949 ai Giorni Nostri, translated by Giorgia Viano Marogna (Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 2003), 171-172; Giovanni Mario Ceci, Moro e il PCI: la Strategia dell’Attenzione e il Dibattito 
Politico Italiano, 1967-1969 (Rome: Carocci, 2013), 66. 
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Repeated Calls to Unity (January - November 1966)  
In 1966, while a ‘constructed peace’ kept Europe stable, the Cold War ravaged 
other endpoints of the Eurasian landmass: the escalation of the Vietnam War 
raised tensions between the two traditionally opposing camps; the frail cohesion 
of the NAM faltered with the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistani conflict; and in the 
PRC, Mao Zedong kept ‘fighting with two fists’ while entrusting the keys of a 
perpetual revolution against the CCP to Chinese youths.11 
 China’s rupture from the socialist camp presented the PCI with an 
opportunity to develop its own foreign policy stance for the first time since 
Palmiro Togliatti’s passing in 1964. The PCI’s intention to forge ties with the 
PRC was in line with its vision of reasserting Rome’s equidistance from both 
Moscow and Washington DC.12 Prior to adopting a strategic posture vis-à-vis 
China, however, the Italian Communists first needed to elaborate one. The 
‘elaboration phase’ of this posture, while generally overlooked in the literature, 
began in January 1966 and lasted until November of the same year: a 
policymaking exercise which would pave the way for the PCI’s effective 
engagement with the CCP throughout the late 1960s. 
 At the heart of an autonomous foreign policy targeting China was the 
Italian Communists’ decision to uphold an intermediate position toward Mao. 
While on the one hand the PCI denounced Beijing for having undermined the 
unity of global communism and for having embarked on the self-imposed folly of 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), on the other hand it praised 
the PRC for having protected Vietnam against US aggression. Others within the 
                                                 
11
 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: the Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton, 
1999), 399; Joseph Yu-Shek Cheng and Franklin Wankun Zhang, “Chinese Foreign Relations Strategies 
Under Mao and Deng: a Systematic and Comparative Analysis,” Politics and Governance 14, no. 3 (1999): 
96. 
12
 See: Luigi Longo, “Per la Pace, per Avanzare sulla Via Italiana al Socialismo per una Nuova Maggioranza 
Democratica e l’Unità delle Forze Operaie e Socialiste,” in Da Gramsci a Berlinguer: la Via Italiana al 
Socialismo Attraverso i Congressi del Partito Comunista Italiano, IV, 1946-1975, ed. Daniele Pugliese and 
Orazio Pugliese (Venice: Marsilio Editori, 1985), 20-3. 
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PCI tried to understand the Maoist rationale behind the GPCR by comparing it to 
the situation that the USSR faced after the assassination of Sergei Kirov.13 While 
apparently contrasting, these messages were ‘calls to unity’ aimed at bringing 
Mao back into the inclusive framework of international socialism.14  
 The intellectual premises of this foreign policy approach came from the 
works of Giorgio Amendola and the late Secretary General Palmiro Togliatti.15 
Amendola was among the first PCI leaders to recognise the need for the Party to 
engage with communist counterparts abroad, and to not be afraid of criticising 
their chosen course of action. He first elaborated his views at a PCI Central 
Committee meeting on November 10th 1961, when PCI key figures gathered to 
discuss policy priorities that had become available to them following the de-
Stalinisation of the CPSU. To Amendola, the relative lack of foreign policy 
supervision from the CPSU finally allowed room for ’polycentrism’, which was 
to become the guiding principle of the PCI’s foreign policy: 
 
Polycentrism has now become necessary. It won’t weaken internationalism […].  
We Italian communists must take part in the discussion of every question and 
express our autonomous judgement on the policies of other parties, on the causes 
of their successes and failures […]. The whole party wants to take part in 
international discussions.16  
 
 Building on Amendola’s views, Palmiro Togliatti emphasized the need for 
the PCI and other communist parties to never antagonize China: an idea which 
first emerged in his 1964 ‘Yalta Memorandum’, in which he warned Soviet 
leaders against ‘allowing the Chinese schism to widen irreparably’. 17  With 
Togliatti’s death in 1964, however, it became difficult to determine who would 
                                                 
13
 Mimmo Scarano, “Un Articolo di ‘Rinascita’: Tre Posizioni del PCI di Fronte a Mao,” Il Giorno, 24 
September 1966.  
14
 In the early 1950s, Mao integrated his nationalistic agenda with the CCP’s commitment to socialist 
internationalism. As a result of having attained greater confidence in the 1950s, however, Mao grew ‘more 
reluctant to accept the new leadership in Moscow within the socialist camp.’ See: Zhimin Chen, 
“Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy”, Journal of Contemporary China 14 no. 42 
(2005): 41-2.  
15
 Scarano, “Un Articolo di ‘Rinascita’”, 1966. 
16
 Sprigge, ‘De-Stalinization in the Italian Communist Party’, 28.  
17
 Luigi Barzini, “Communism, Italian Style, Has Nowhere to Go,” The New York Times, 13 February 1966. 
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carry his and Amendola’s foreign policy blueprint forward. After all, both the PCI 
Directorate and the party base were convinced that Togliatti’s interest in the 
international dimension of the PCI mandate had become the mere apanage of a 
party elite that had lost touch with its electorate.18 
 Enrico Berlinguer came to the fore as the most likely candidate for the 
protection of Togliatti’s legacy. By 1966, he had been managing the Party’s 
foreign affairs department for four years. Unlike several of the PCI’s militant 
leftist allies focusing on domestic class struggles,19 Berlinguer understood the 
significance of reshaping the identity of the PCI as a foreign policy actor within 
the Italian political sphere, especially in its dealings with an interlocutor as 
preponderant as China. On 1 January 1966, he articulated Botteghe Oscure’s 
foreign policy posture vis-à-vis Zhongnanhai in the editorial ‘La Coesistenza 
Pacifica’: 
 
On the one hand, … we cannot ignore the fact that a large-scale and calumnious 
imperialist campaign [targeting China] is currently taking place. On the other 
hand, we cannot allow for the position articulated by the Chinese comrades on 
issues of war and peace to be taken […] as positions of the communist movement 
in general, and of our party in particular. We must, therefore, openly voice our 
dissent […].20 
 
Berlinguer thus began to operate in ‘solitary continuity’ with Togliatti and 
Amendola – an initiative which required the PCI to signal its departure away 
from its domestic and international isolation in a more forceful manner.21 The 
PCI took advantage of two occasions in particular to do so: the PCI 11th Party 
Congress in January 1966, and the 45th anniversary of the establishment of the 
CCP in July of the same year. 
                                                 
18
 Galeazzi, Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi Non Allineati, 149.  
19
 I’m here referring to the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). 
20
 Enrico Berlinguer, ‘La Coesistenza Pacifica’, Rinascita, 1, 1 January 1966.  
21
 Galeazzi, Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi Non Allineati, 15; Gian Carlo Pajetta believed the PCI to have 
been conditioned by “illusions” that the DC “harboured” about the domestic and foreign policy isolation of 
the Italian Communists. See: Gian Carlo Pajetta’s report to the PCI Central Committee (CC), l’Unità, 15 
February 1968.  
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The 11th PCI Party Congress took place three weeks after Berlinguer’s 
publication of ‘La Coesistenza Pacifica’, and merely four days after the 
dissolution of the second Moro government.22 The event propelled the PCI back 
into the limelight, as it was the first Congress held in the aftermath of the CPSU’s 
de-Stalinisation and the first to be led by Togliatti’s successor Secretary General 
Luigi Longo, a moderate right-leaning Togliattian. The Party Congress also 
presented Berlinguer with the opportunity to show he possessed the diplomatic 
skill necessary to mediate between two competing camps that had formed within 
the PCI, one being the dissident wing of sinistra interna led by Pietro Ingrao, and 
the other being destra comunista, led by Giorgio Amendola and supported by 
Secretary Longo.23 While members of the former faction strove to overthrow 
capitalism in Italy and covertly challenged Longo’s leadership, members of the 
latter faction were right-leaning Togliattians who supported the notion of 
“progressive democracy”.24 While the details of the debate lie beyond the scope 
of this work, it needs to be noted that the 11th Congress ended with the PCI’s 
ousting of Ingrao (“the heretic”) and the exclusion of his sinistra interna: a 
political move which appeared to be going directly against the Party’s intention of 
enhancing its internal cohesion while advocating for the unity of international 
communism.  
 Botteghe Oscure’s internal struggles didn’t go unnoticed in Zhongnanhai. 
Following the 11th CPI Party Congress, Chinese newspaper Cankao Xiaoxi 
endowed the PCI’s ideological divide with new meaning, depicting it as a 
struggle between a pro-Soviet and a pro-Maoist faction, stating that ‘the increase 
of Marxist-Leninist forces within the PCI’ (Pietro Ingrao’s sinistra interna) had 
become a threat to the ‘revisionist faction’ loyal to Luigi Longo.25 The Secretary 
                                                 
22
 “Una Maggioranza Compatta e Leale - dice Moro Accettando l’Incarico”, Avanti, 26 January 1966. 
23
 Lucio Magri, Alla Ricerca di un Altro Comunismo: Saggi sulla Sinistra Italiana (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 
2012), 54. 
24
 Robert C. Doty, ‘Italy’s Reds Face Threat of a Split’, The New York Times, 23 January 1966; Magri, Alla 
Ricerca di un Altro Comunismo, 55; ‘Il PCI Non Sopporta Alcun Dissenso – Ribadito il Monolitismo 
Comunista’, Corriere della Sera, 29 January 1966 
25
 Extracts from Cankao Xiaoxi, 1966, FG, APC, Partito, Estero, 0536/1408, Fondazione Gramsci (FG), 
Archivio Partito Comunista (APC).  
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General was described as a leader under siege, ‘incapable of doing anything’ due 
to the influence that ‘the Chinese Communist Party exerted on the PCI party 
base’.26 The CCP’s reactions to the PCI’s initial calls for a united communist 
movement didn’t turn out to be positive, either, as the PCI’s ideologically strict 
but overall benevolent posture towards China was mistaken for an overt attack 
against the CCP and the validity of its socialist experience. The CCP thus accused 
Secretary Longo of having failed to fully understand Mao’s motives, and blamed 
him for having described the policies of the CCP as ‘not intelligent’.27  
 After having been accused of political monolithism in the aftermath of 
Pietro Ingrao’s ousting, Botteghe Oscure was compelled to reflect upon its 
political identity and the future of its political legacy: a process which caused the 
Italian Communists to become caught up in another intra-party ideological 
debate. Now that a right-leaning group had prevailed within the PCI, but that 
Marxist-Leninist conservatism was regaining the upper hand in France and 
Russia, would the PCI be able to carry out its autonomous foreign policy 
strategy? 28 In order to engage with the CCP and other communist parties abroad, 
would the PCI be able to synthesize ‘internationalism’ and the idea of ‘nation’, 
ultimately bringing Mao closer to its ideological camp? 29  
 To solve these internal conundrums while breaking the impasse it had 
entered with the CCP, on 7 July 1966 the PCI CC celebrated the 45th anniversary 
of the establishment of the CCP by issuing a call to unity to its interlocutor: 
 
Even in Italy, … the political fight aimed at letting our country refuse any 
understanding, any solidarity, any complicity with the North American aggressors 
continues. … To counter the aggressions of imperialism, to protect the rights and 
support the strife of the Vietnamese people and of other oppressed or brutalized 
                                                 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. See also: Marco Galeazzi, Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi Non Allineati (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 
2011), 149. 
29
 This is reflective of another PCI debate that took place in 1966. It concerned the PCI’s foreign policy 
designs vis-à-vis the communist parties of countries belonging to the NAM. See: Galeazzi, Il PCI e il 
Movimento dei Paesi non Allineati, 148-149.  
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peoples, […] today more than ever it has become urgent to [maintain] unity 
within the international communist movement.30 
 
Emphasis was placed on presenting Italy in general and the PCI in 
particular as forces unaffected by Cold War dynamics. Once again, the PCI’s 
ultimate aim was to bring Mao back into the overarching framework of 
communist internationalism out of certainty that it would have been impossible 
for him to achieve his desiderata, had he continued to antagonize the USSR. As 
pointed out by the director of Rinascita Giancarlo Pajetta, the CCP needed to ease 
tensions with the CPSU not in a spirit of subordinate loyalty to Moscow, but 
merely in recognition of the quality of the USSR’s socialist experience: 
 
Us Italian communists […] believe we are [making a contribution] even to parties 
which are more advanced [than us] in their socialist experience. We nonetheless 
believe that we’ll be able to continue doing so insofar as we [can] demonstrate to 
have fully grasped what the fruit of the Soviet comrades’ experience means to us. 
And this is … because of the characteristics specific to the Soviet experience 
[which] …, with its history and scope, still expresses itself in a compelling 
fashion ….31 
 
Notwithstanding the PCI’s bona fide in wishing to engage more fruitfully 
with the CCP, by August 1966 the GPCR loomed large on any attempt to foster 
Sino-Italian inter-communist party ties.32 Aware of the possible CCP isolation 
that was to come, the Italian Communists sought to understand China’s situation 
more thoroughly, but had not been receiving first-hand accounts from the PRC 
since August 1964, when PCI member Aldo Passigli visited Beijing to meet his 
wife Primrose Gigliesi and report on the status of the local Italian community.33  
Botteghe Oscure thus opted to monitor the situation from afar, which was 
made possible by the PCI Secretariat’s access to the Xinhua News Agency 
bulletin and to publications from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the Democratic 
                                                 
30
 PCI CC to CCP CC, 7 July 1966, Partito, Estero, 0536/1571, FG, APC. 
31
 Giancarlo Pajetta, “Il Congresso di Mosca,” Rinascita, 14, 2 April 1966. 
32
 Mario Alicata, “La Cina e noi,” l’Unità, 25 September 1966.  
33
 Aldo Passigli, August 1966, “Report from China,” Partito, Estero, 0536/1604-1611, FG, APC. 
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People’s Republic of Korea. Towards the end of 1966, while it had become clear 
that these publications were critical of Maoist China and the GPCR, the PCI 
continued publishing translated articles to illustrate the senselessness of Mao’s 
isolation as seen by other communist regimes.34 By this time, PCI leaders looking 
at the GPCR either ‘justified’ it by comparing the situation in China to that of the 
USSR in 1934, ‘understood’ it by placing it within a Marxist ideological 
framework, or ‘severely condemned’ it by disproving its Leninist foundations.35 
Granting visibility to articles from socialist newspapers critical of China, 
however, increased bilateral diplomatic tensions. As an unfavourable situation for 
the PRC continued unravelling at the UN, CCP Party organs immediately took 
issue with the Christian Democrat director of the UNGA 20th Session Amintore 
Fanfani, the Christian Democrat PM of Italy and leader of a ‘Western puppet 
regime’ Aldo Moro, and Pope Paul VI.36  
The PCI thus sought the help of a reporter from Rinascita, Augusto Livi, 
to learn about the GPCR’s most recent developments.37  In October 1966, by 
looking at the GPCR through Augusto Livi’s reports, the Italian Communists 
came to the sobering conclusion that the CCP had ignored their calls to solidarity 
after having become irreparably obsessed with the search for the country’s 
‘superstructural unity’ – a mistake which Livi believed the USSR had made, 
unlike Italy:38 
 
This is not about justifying [Mao’s] gross errors. Rather, it is about bringing the 
subject back to the framework of the superstructure, and to the issues which the 
Italian Communist Party has had to confront when it rejected State atheism, State 
aesthetics, and mono-partitism as the sole way to socialism. […] the distortions 
taking place in China will be neither understandable, nor surmountable, if we 
don’t tackle a broad ideal debate on the function of the revolutionary party and on 
the way in which, often mistakenly, this function has been understood in the 
                                                 
34
 “Mosca: Articolo della Pravda sul Socialismo e l’Eredità Culturale,” l’Unità, 17 September 1966. 
35
 Matthew E. Lenoe, The Kirov Murder and Soviet History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); 
Scarano, ‘Un articolo di “Rinascita”’, 1966. 
36
 “Furioso attacco di Nuova Cina: Pechino ingiuria il Papa, U Thant e Fanfani,” Il Tempo, 23 September 
1966.  
37
 Augusto Livi, October 1966, “Additional Letter,” Partito, Estero, 0536/1639-1652, FG, APC. 
38
 Ibid., 1651. 
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USSR.39 
 
 
Augusto Livi’s account corroborated the idea by which the Italian 
Communists, too, could make a contribution to shaping China’s socialist 
experience, also motivating the PCI to carry on with the formulation of its 
autonomous ‘China policy’. With the end of the foreign policy ‘elaboration 
phase’ for Botteghe Oscure, however, time had come for the Party to allow for its 
foreign policy designs to enter an ‘implementation phase’, getting the PCI and the 
CCP to talk to each other, rather than past one another. As it is argued in the 
following section, the domestic and international circumstances necessary for the 
Italian Communists to bring the CCP closer to the PCI would materialize with the 
unfolding of US-USSR détente.40 
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 Ibid., 0536/1651-2. 
40
 Galeazzi, Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi non Allineati, 148-157.  
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Asymmetric Alliances (December 1966 - December 1969) 
By December 1966, the PCI recognized that the issuing of congratulatory letters 
to the CCP hardly counted as part of an ‘original and autonomous’ China 
policy.41 It was time for the PCI to reopen its channels of direct communication 
with the CCP, especially after China’s schism from socialist internationalism 
increasingly looked like a fait accompli,  and after the DC’s ‘secret diplomacy’ 
had proven a failure.42  
 The isolation of the PRC at the height of the first cycle of the GPCR 
compelled the PCI not to immediately entertain relations with the CCP, but to set 
the ground at home and abroad for a PCI-CCP rapprochement to happen as soon 
as the dust would start settling in the PRC. Domestically, the PCI attempted to 
shape the Italian coalition government’s China policy by taking advantage of 
Prime Minister Aldo Moro’s opening to the Italian Left and by engaging in 
foreign policy dialogues with the DC’s leftist current, known as Sinistra di Base. 
Internationally, the PCI fostered ties with Kim Il-sung and the KWP, often 
visiting Pyongyang with the intent of never losing sight of Mao. While the term 
‘asymmetric alliance’ has been previously used to describe the PCI’s forging of 
stronger domestic ties with the Italian government, as demonstrated by the 
                                                 
41
 Sprigge, “De-Stalinization in the Italian communist party,” 25. 
42
 Togliatti was the first Italian politician to send an envoy to Beijing after it became clear that the 
Communists had won the Chinese Civil War. See: Letter of Introduction for Velio Spano, 29 July 1949, FG, 
FPT, Corrispondenza Politica; For commentary on China’s schism, see: “Un discorso di Novotný – Praga 
con Mosca contro Pechino,” Corriere della Sera, 26 September 1966, Archivio storico del Senato; Chinese 
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Pira to send one letter and one telegram to Zhou Enlai to wish him a Merry Christmas and a happy New 
Year. See: “1964 nian shengdan jie Yidali Foluolunsa shizhang zhi Zhou Enlai zongli hedian chuli yijian” 
[Processing advice on the Christmas 1964 telegram by the mayor of Florence Giorgio La Pira to Premier 
Zhou Enlai], Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu dang’an guan [Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, People’s Republic of China], 24 December 1964, 117-01228-03, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
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political relationship Enrico Berlinguer entertained with Aldo Moro, in this 
section This expression is here employed to refer to the relationship that the KWP 
entertained with the PCI – an initially marginalized partner that the Korean 
comrades soon began to trust more than the CCP and the CPSU. 43 
The PCI started moving autonomously on the Cold War chessboard as 
early as 5 December 1966, when Enrico Berlinguer led a PCI delegation to 
Hanoi. 44  While a thorough analysis of the PCI’s ties with the Vietnamese 
Workers’ Party (VWP) at the height of the Vietnam War is beyond the scope of 
this work, what is important to note is that the occasion constituted an 
opportunity for the PCI to be seen by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be 
striving to achieve its foreign policy aims independently.45 It also became an 
opportunity for Botteghe Oscure to expose Hanoi to Socialism with Italian 
characteristics, as demonstrated by the decision of the Holy See to nominate 
Berlinguer as an informal spokesperson for Pope Paul VI.46 
 In Vietnam, the PCI appeared to have very little room for manoeuvre vis-
à-vis the Italian government, given that Ambassador Giovanni D’Orlandi, 
together with his US and Polish counterparts, had been very actively engaged in 
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the drafting of a peace deal. A Cold War theatre in which it could act in solitary 
autonomy with the added benefit of never losing track of Mao, however, was the 
DPRK. After having been monitoring Pyongyang’s response to Mao’s anarchic 
drift on Rodong Sinmun articles as published on Pravda, Botteghe Oscure opted 
to send PCI leaders to Pyongyang for four times between 1966 and 1969.47 This 
was done to ensure that the GPCR was not part of a more widespread Northeast-
Asian communist malaise, to explore the political implications of the Sino-Soviet 
split for the unity of global communism, and to invite the KWP to a new 
International Conference organized under the auspices of the PCI. 
 The first PCI delegation to the DPRK, led by Enrico Berlinguer, met with 
KWP CC member Kim So-sen on December 19th 1966 to discuss the DPRK’s 
‘clear disapproval’ of the Cultural Revolution.48 What emerged from the meeting 
was that the KWP, too, had been issuing repeated calls to unity to the CCP in the 
hope of maintaining socialist internationalism intact and bringing the GPCR to 
standstill.49 On the following day, Kim Il-sung welcomed the PCI delegation in 
his private residence to discuss these matters further.50 While admitting of having 
grown somewhat critical of the CPSU, Kim Il-sung confirmed Kim So-sen’s 
message, emphasizing that political tensions between the CCP and the KWP had 
further intensified:  
 
For what concerns the CCP: we have many divergences with the Chinese 
comrades. There are many things that we cannot accept; […] but above all, we 
cannot accept the accusation of no longer being a socialist country […] that the 
Chinese comrades direct against the USSR. We told Chinese comrades: “give us 
concrete evidence of your accusations”, but they haven’t provided us with 
anything other than rhetoric.51 
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Of particular interest was Kim Il-sung’s view of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution (GPCR), about which he talked at great length: 
We don’t know what will happen; the confrontation is now open, and is framed 
around three points: (1) the united front question, namely the question of which is 
the main enemy (imperialism or revisionism?); (2) the question of who should 
lead the Cultural Revolution (the Party or the Red Guards?); (3) the Maoism 
question (a Chinese internal affair, or an international problem?). …we’re against 
Maoism and Lin Biao’s interpretation of the Cultural Revolution, because a 
man’s conscience can’t be transformed by force.52  
 
 
The Great Leader also welcomed Berlinguer’s idea of organizing another 
International Conference to restore the unity of global communism. Yet, he’d 
only join the Conference if it brought together all of the world’s communist and 
labour parties – a difficult task to achieve, given that the CCP would not 
participate in the presence of the CPSU, and that communist parties from the rest 
of the world would not join in the absence of both the CPSU and the CCP.  
 What was to be done about China, then? Kim Il-sung suggested the Italian 
Communists set aside existing ideological divergences, and to not overtly oppose 
the CCP. After all, the KWP leader had been silently opposing the CCP for 
almost a decade by preventing Maoism from entering the DPRK, but would have 
never taken an openly accusatory stance against Mao.53 Kim’s implicit request 
was for Berlinguer and the Italian Communists, therefore, to act accordingly.  
 However sensible, Kim Il-sung’s advice did not resonate with the Italian 
Communists’ idée fixe of initiating autonomous foreign policy action. Barely a 
month after Berlinguer’s visit to Pyongyang, progressive PCI member Franco 
Bertone turned to Rinascita to voice the PCI’s determination not to keep silent on 
the anarchic drift of Maoism, even at the expense of moving further away from 
the CCP:  
 
[The international labor movement] cannot be a mere spectator. … it should not 
merely follow the events and strive to understand them, but express a political 
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judgement …. The accusations of ‘interference’ that may be directed against a 
display of interest [in the Chinese situation] surely cannot be accepted.54 
 
 
Later in the year, Bertone’s views were backed up (yet softened) by 
Secretary General Luigi Longo, who placed emphasis on the need for the PCI to 
act as a protagonist of the global communist movement and, when necessary, 
become more vocal in denouncing Mao’s mistakes:55   
 
Faced with all the issues that … concern the communist and labour movement 
and its unity, we can’t hold our position as critics and foreign mentors; instead, 
we want to be interlocutors and protagonists of each debate …. To us, discussing 
doesn’t mean saying ‘no’ to unity; on the contrary, it means looking for ways to 
achieve it and consolidate it.56 
 
 
 Little did Longo know, the CCP was fast approaching the zenith of its 
international isolation, and would not wish to interact with Western interlocutors 
let alone critical ones. As testament to this, on March 15th 1968 the PCI 
Secretariat received a communiqué from the Italian branch of Xinhua News 
Agency, confirming that the CCP party organ would no longer send its bulletin to 
foreign countries ‘due to technical and organisational reasons’.57  
 The Italian Communists thus appeared to be giving up on their ambitions 
of engaging more meaningfully with the CCP. Yet, they knew Beijing coveted 
nothing more than obtaining diplomatic recognition at a bilateral and multilateral 
level, and that the only way to foster friendly relations with the CCP consisted in 
helping it achieve its political goals. At the time, with China’s complete isolation 
on the one hand, and the possibility for PCI members to travel to China only in 
secret on the other, it became evident that the only way in which the PCI’s China-
policy blueprints could come to fruition would consist in sharing them with the 
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Italian government.58 A domestic ‘asymmetric alliance’ for the PCI thus started 
taking shape alongside the international one that had already been established 
with Kim Il-sung. 
 On 12 December 1966 the PCI Directorate sent a letter to the President of 
the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, requesting that the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs reported directly to the Commission on issues 
concerning Italy’s stance on the PRC’s accession to the United Nations (UN). By 
voicing its commitment to the PRC’s accession rights, the PCI hoped to turn 
Togliatti and Amendola’s ‘intermediate position’ into the guiding principle of the 
Italian government’s tentative China policy: 
 
… with regards to the position Italy upheld during the voting sessions 
[concerning the PRC’s accession to the UN], [we believe this] to be profoundly 
wrong and contrary to the UN principle of universality and the requirements of 
peace. It is absurd and unacceptable that the entry into the UN of a nation as big 
as China has to be contingent upon … ascertainment measures of any kind. … a 
new system of international relations cannot be forged without the participation 
of the People’s Republic of China, and primarily without the restitution to the 
People’s Republic of China of the UN seat to which it is entitled.59 
 
The letter was indicative of the level of confidence that the PCI reached after 
having devoted time to intra-party ideological debates, monitoring China’s 
situation from afar, and keeping track of what Mao wished to gain from the 
international community. From this moment on, it became clear that the PCI’s 
communist battles ‘would be fought within the realm of foreign policy’. 60  
 The PCI’s China policy had thus formally entered its ‘implementation 
phase’. A question that arises, then, is how responsive the Italian government was 
to the PCI’s stated foreign policy preference. Archival documents reveal that 
while the PCI’s growing international influence could be attributed to efforts 
made by the Italian Communists alone, the PCI’s relevance within the Italian 
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political sphere was largely contingent upon the readiness of Prime Minister Aldo 
Moro and the DC leftist current known as Sinistra di Base to initiate dialogue 
with Botteghe Oscure on political and foreign policy matters – two phenomena 
potentially favoured by the beginning of US-USSR détente in 1968.  
 Détente had eased Cold War ideological tensions. It was a strategic 
component of US foreign policy, as it sought to protect the bipolar order and to 
‘contain’ the Soviet threat through dialogue in an era of waning US leadership. At 
the same time, détente was a foreign policy strategy through which the Kremlin, 
too, sought to prop up its own unstable leadership within a frail socialist camp. 
Yet, it was a strategy which ultimately accelerated the decline of USSR primacy 
within said socialist camp, especially in the wake of the 1968 Soviet intervention 
in Czechoslovakia.61   
 Both of these aspects of détente had a profound impact on Italian politics, 
intertwining with political and social dynamics that came to destabilize the 
traditional domestic party-system. 62  The attenuation of anti-communist 
sentiments in the US and Europe, the crisis of the international communist 
movement (due to the Czech affair and the Sino-Soviet split), and the emergence 
of a divide between Europe and the United States eliminated any resistance 
against parliamentary and social compromise that could potentially be found 
between the Centre-Left and the PCI.  
 Prime Minister Aldo Moro immediately grasped the momentousness of 
the opportunities brought by détente to the realm of Italian politics. Now that 
communist parties across Europe were less of a concern for Washington DC, and 
that the Italian coalition government had been weakened by the 1968 election 
outcome, it was no longer advisable for the DC and the Italian Socialist Party 
(PSI) to base the legitimacy of their leadership on purely anti-communist 
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grounds.63 What was needed, instead, was ‘careful consideration’of the instances 
of the Italian Communists. 64 This was how Moro’s signature initiative, strategia 
dell’attenzione, came into being – an ‘attention strategy’ through which the 
government sought non-ministerial cooperation, having acknowledged the PCI as 
a force to be reckoned with. 
 The DC made clear that the only limit to Aldo Moro’s strategia 
dell’attenzione would be the inclusion of the PCI in a coalition government. The 
Italian Communists, however, did not seek to reach governmental ranks, as they 
were aware of the privilege that derived from being part of the opposition vis-à-
vis the liability of playing a weaker role as part of a multi-party government.65 
The PCI thus continued advocating for its foreign policy autonomy, elaborating 
nuanced critiques of Mao’s political moves while at the same time calling on the 
Italian government to push for Italy’s diplomatic recognition of China, and 
China’s accession to the UN.  
 Aldo Moro’s openness to the PCI was also reflected in the actions of 
representatives from the DC’s leftist current, Sinistra di Base (the members of 
which were known as basisti), who showed great interest in the foreign policy 
proposals of the Italian Communists. The basisti invited PCI representatives to 
two of their congresses in April and May 1969, the second of which was entirely 
dedicated to foreign policy issues. 66  On that occasion, the basisti heavily 
criticized the leading currents of the DC for having been unable to formulate a 
coherent foreign policy strategy for the DC in particular, and for Italy in 
general.67 They believed the alliance between the Christian Democrats, the Italian 
Socialist and the Republicans to have become ‘partially void’, transformed into a 
mere game of ‘power partition’. This called for the DC to engage more 
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proactively with the PCI, and to do so especially on foreign policy matters, as 
there was a need for the DC-PSI government to treat Third World countries on a 
par, and to ensure the PRC would be admitted to the UN.68 Luigi Granelli in 
particular seems to have acknowledged the nuances of the PCI’s foreign policy 
stances, praising the party not only for its being ‘representative of important 
masses’ within Italy, but also for having demonstrated to possess ‘reputable 
international influence’. Granelli then called on the DC to follow the PCI’s 
example by starting to focus on foreign policy issues, too, emphasising that the 
value of the PCI’s ‘discourse on the East’ could no longer be ‘underestimated’ by 
the DC in general and by the government in particular.69  
 Positive progress notwithstanding, by 1969, the PCI was confronted with 
the negative impact of its attacks against the CCP (irrespective of Kim Il-sung’s 
advice) on its foreign policy aims. On 14 January, PCI Foreign Affairs 
Commission delegate Renato Sandri visited the Embassy of the PRC in Bern to 
deliver an official invitation to the Central Committee of the CCP, hoping that a 
delegation from Beijing would join the PCI’s upcoming party Congress.70 Upon 
having illustrated the  ‘PCI Theses from the X Party Congress’ to the ambassador, 
Sandri was accused of being the representative of a party that had become a ‘US 
lackey’.71 Urged to leave, Sandri asked his interlocutor to at least allow the PCI 
and the CCP to maintain friendly relations while ‘agreeing to disagree’ on certain 
ideological aspects – a plea to which the ambassador replied: ‘You only have one 
option. Publicly proclaim your acceptance of the thought of our great President’.72 
Compared with previously held meetings, Sandri reported having detected 
‘formal ungraciousness’ in the manners of his host, and the ‘transformation into 
hate’ of what he previously believed to be mere ‘political fervour’. 
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 Ungraciousness notwithstanding, the occasion constituted a watershed 
moment for both the PCI and the CCP, as the two parties had gone back to talk to 
each other, rather than past one another. In the summer of 1969, the CCP took the 
initiative of sending a few diplomats back to their foreign posts, thereby 
dispatching Huang Cheng back to Paris. In the view of Asian diplomats stationed 
in Beijing, Huang Cheng’s return to Paris signalled the CCP’s intention to forge 
diplomatic ties with Italy. This meant that China had come to recognize France 
and its transalpine neighbour as bulwarks of that ‘intermediate position’ that 
Togliatti had envisioned almost a decade earlier.73 As yet another testament to the 
positive effects that the PCI’s interactions with the Italian coalition government 
had on growing Sino-Italian engagement, on 14 July 1969 (for the first time in the 
timeframe examined) the Italian MFA Secretary General Casto Caruso instructed 
the Italian ambassador to the UN Piero Vinci to vote in favour of the PRC’s 
accession to the UN, explicitly stating that this would be a way for the Italian 
government to ‘eliminate one of the many diverging points that the opposition 
[i.e. the PCI] use[s] to put the government in a difficult position’.74 
These developments, rather than being ends in themselves, were soon seen 
as prelude to a time often celebrated as the beginning of the ‘golden age’ of PCI-
CCP bilateral engagement – namely, the years of both parties’ initial 
rapprochement.  
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Rapprochement (January 1970 - October 1971) 
In the early 1970s, détente reached a new pinnacle.75 The PRC’s improvement of 
ties with Yugoslavia and Hungary, together with the decision to maintain Warsaw 
as the capital of Sino-US dialogues, signalled the reversing of China’s isolation.76 
 The historiography documenting Italy’s role in this delicate passage of the 
Cold War generally focuses on Prime Minister Aldo Moro’s and Enrico 
Berlinguer’s efforts in giving substance to the inter-governmental dimension of 
Sino-Italian ties.77 Yet, as the actions of key DC figures in 1970 and 1971 were 
constrained by the inescapability of Atlanticism, while the PCI CC was 
preoccupied with administrative elections and with determining Italy’s posture in 
the Mediterranean, what is often overlooked is the way in which a micro-cosmos 
of lower-ranking PCI affiliates contributed to the development of a new phase of 
PCI-CCP ‘rapprochement’ – an inter-communist party dynamic which helped 
favour the normalisation of inter-governmental ties between the PRC and Italy.78   
 On 24 April 24 1970, Giorgio Signorini from the communist-leaning 
newspaper Paese Sera visited the PRC. Documenting his trip to Berlinguer, 
Signorini confirmed to have met with Wang Shou-tao, CCP CC member and 
vice-president of the CCP office for Central and Southern China. With reference 
to Wang Shou-tao’s hospitality, Signorini commented: 
 
I don’t want to overestimate the importance of this meeting, but … Beijing has 
made the conscious decision of going back to an autonomous position …, 
rejecting the creation of groups and small groups obedient to China within 
Western communist parties. They’ve gone back to a certain degree of realism: 
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[resuming] talks with actors that really matter, giving up on the radical 
manoeuvres of the politics of rupture ….79   
 
The PCI had thus become an actor that ‘really mattered’ to Wang Shou-tao, 
allowing PCI leaders to finally start seeing the effects of their foreign policy 
blueprints after years of debating, implementing, and adjusting. It also became 
evident that the meeting had taken place under the auspices of the CCP, as it 
would have been otherwise improbable for Signorini, a PCI-affiliated reporter, to 
be welcomed by a member of the CCP CC himself.        
Other correspondents from PCI party organ l’Unità were equally 
committed to allowing Botteghe Oscure to strengthen its ties to Zhongnanhai. 
Reporter Alberto Jacoviello was one of the most involved in the process, acting as 
an unofficial advisor to both Longo and Berlinguer. 80   On June 16th 1970, 
Jacoviello followed up an invitation to Paris by Sung Chih-kuang, chargé 
d’affaires of the PRC to France. Jacoviello’s visit was designed for him to re-
open a channel of communication that had originally been established by his 
colleague from l’Unità, Maria Antonietta Macciocchi. 81 Jacoviello’s notes from 
the meeting with Sung Chih-kuang, unlike Renato Sandri’s discouraging account  
from Bern, indicated that CCP representatives:  
 
… demonstrated great interest in our opinions on the topics that we’ve covered 
…. When we asked whether it would have been possible to re-establish normal 
contacts [with the CCP], either through official or non-official means, they 
answered that … things needed to proceed ‘one small step at a time’; yet, they’ve 
also insisted in making us aware of the fact that ‘inviting a communist deputy and 
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the head of the PCI CC foreign service to lunch … already constitutes a small 
step’. 82 
 
Sung Chih-kuang mentioned that his meeting with Jacoviello and 
Macciocchi would be evaluated in Beijing under the overarching framework of 
inter-communist party ties, also confirming that CCP officials were willing to 
meet with PCI officials whenever the latter had wished to see the former. 83  
Furthermore, Sung added that Beijing would issue visas to Jacoviello and 
Macciocchi, who were set to visit the PRC between November and December 
1970. What is worth noting from Jacoviello’s account, however, is that this new 
phase of PCI-CCP engagement took place at a time when the CCP was yet to 
establish ‘contacts with the French Communist Party’, thereby highlighting the 
CCP’s growing trust of the PCI as an authoritative voice of the Western European 
left. 84 
 As previously shown, the DC’s leftist currents (which had taken foreign 
policy matters to heart) had come to appreciate the effects that the PCI’s foreign 
policy initiatives had brought upon the development of Sino-Italian ties. 85  This 
general appraisal was once again made evident one month after Jacoviello’s visit 
to Paris, when he met with the then-President of the Italian Senate Amintore 
Fanfani, who claimed to ‘hate the Socialists’ due to their ambition of acting ‘as 
intermediaries between the Communists and the Christian Democrats’. Instead, 
he argued, there was a need for DC and PCI members to talk directly to each 
other to avoid misunderstandings on foreign policy matters. 86  Jacoviello also 
noted the impression that Fanfani wished to establish contacts with figures at the 
highest levels of the PCI’s hierarchy, such as Longo and Berlinguer – an 
observation which possibly hinted at the added value that the PCI’s non-
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ministerial advice could bring to the Italian government, particularly at a time 
when Fanfani was ‘very concerned about the fraying [of the DC] into currents’.87   
 The normalisation of Sino-Italian diplomatic relations became official on 
6 November 1970. While Prime Minister Moro complained with President 
Saragat about having been somewhat ‘pressured’ into recognizing the PRC after 
Canada had taken the lead on the issue, Botteghe Oscure celebrated the fulfilment 
of one of its long-term foreign policy goals.88 The PCI CC sent a cable to the 
CCP CC, wishing for China to enter a phase of ‘fruitful development’.89 Yet, the 
Italian Communists were aware of the fact that their work was far from being 
over, and while PM Moro wished for China’s admission to the UN to be delayed 
as much as possible, the PCI sought to take advantage of recent events to call on 
the Italian government to bring the ‘only and legitimate’ PRC government to its 
UN seat, thereby not contradicting its decision to recognize the PRC as a party 
with which to entertain diplomatic relations.90 
 Jacoviello and Macciocchi were thus sent to China to strengthen the PCI-
CCP communication channel that had been re-opened in Paris, while at the same 
time allowing Jacoviello to author a series of reports on the PRC for l’Unità, 
where he set to document ‘the great and tiresome and hard-fought travail’ that the 
PCI had undergone to find its ‘autonomous and original’ place within the 
international and labour communist movement.91 In a letter sent to Luigi Longo 
from Shanghai, Jacoviello confirmed to have found CCP key figures still ‘stuck 
to their positions’, yet ‘interested in listening’ to the PCI.92 In an attempt not to 
displease the CCP while Jacoviello and Macciocchi were in the PRC, PCI-
affiliated author Emilio Sarzi Amadé wrote to the then-director of l’Unità Aldo 
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Tortorella that it would have been best for party organ contributors to tone down 
their vitriolic critiques of the CCP, given that these had allegedly caused ‘some 
semi-opened doors’ in Beijing ‘to shut down completely’. 
 The 1st Commission of the PCI CC, having harnessed the potential of PCI 
initiatives on Sino-Italian ties, gathered in Rome to determine the future of Italian 
foreign policy and to elevate the PCI’s China policy to governmental status, 
transforming it into ‘an element of national unity’. 93 In particular, the PCI was to 
continue denouncing US government circles for the pressure they had exerted on 
the Italian government throughout the 1960s, both in Parliament and at the UN, 
and to dissolve the Atlantic ‘bloc of political power’ that the DC had been 
supporting. To Secretary Longo, for instance, time had come to remind Nixon 
that Italy – one of its most trusted allies – had chosen to recognize the PRC, and 
that he should be held accountable for the ambiguity shown towards the issue 
China’s recognition. 94  
 The PCI thus hoped to favour China’s admission to the UN in the same 
way it had taken gradual steps towards favouring the normalisation of Sino-
Italian ties. Yet, it soon became clear that the ‘China question’ at the UN would 
be difficult to entangle by solely relying on inter-communist party ties. After all, 
it was on that occasion that the Italian government abstained from voting, being 
too exposed to the influences of US diktats to act as independently as the Italian 
Communists had wanted. On 25 October 1971, when the PRC was admitted to 
the UN, politician and journalist Romano Ledda bitterly observed:  
 
To claim that the Italian government has made a fool of itself is reductive; […] 
we have very rarely been exposed to such a crushing humiliation, and very rarely 
there had been such a glaring renunciation of the exercise of our autonomy of 
judgement […] and [autonomy] of stance vis-à-vis our ‘biggest ally’. 95  
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In his invective against the Italian coalition government (which the PCI had spent 
three years directly advising), Ledda took issue with the inability of the DC and 
the PSI to recognize the magnitude of their diplomatic mishandling of the China 
question. To Ledda, the Italian government had once again given proof of its 
structural inability to move beyond Cold War dynamics, and it had done so at a 
time when it instead hoped to ‘overcome two opposing blocs’ and achieve 
‘neutrality’, even.  
The normalisation of Sino-Italian ties, however, had not happened in a 
vacuum. While apparently marginal to the inter-governmental dimension of Sino-
Italian relations, the PCI’s efforts towards strengthening inter-communist party 
ties with the aim of making normalisation possible are indicative of the structural 
and ideational capabilities the PCI employed to act as a ‘State within the State’, 
thereby seeking to shape the agenda-setting phase of Italy’s ‘China policy’.96  
PCI-CCP interactions, albeit seemingly inconsequential, enhanced the process of 
Sino-Italian bilateral dialogue in both an iterative and incremental fashion, and 
while it would be unusual for Western observers to value inter-communist party 
interactions over inter-governmental ones, there is a need to remind ourselves of 
the centrality that the bureaucracies of real socialism – the PRC in primis – would 
grant to inter-party dialogues. At the very least, there is reason to believe that the  
Italian Communists’ openness had contributed to making the Western world more 
accepting of Maoist China. 
 
Conclusion  
This study documented the Italian Communist Party’s interactions with the 
Communist Party of China in the years leading to the normalisation of Sino-
Italian relations. The main objective with this paper was to fill a historiographical 
void; yet, a series of secondary purposes lied at the heart of this study. One was to 
                                                 
96
 Marco Galeazzi notes that the PCI ‘seen by many as almost like a State’, had caught ‘the interest and the 
consideration of the West as well as that of the the extra-European world […]’ See: Marco Galeazzi, Il PCI e 
il Movimento dei Paesi Non Allineati, 192. See also Antonio Varsori, “Prefazione”. Preface to Marco 
Galeazzi, Il PCI e il Movimento dei Paesi Non Allineati, 7.. 
  29 
analyse the internal debates that enabled the PCI to create its autonomous China 
policy. Another one was to show how, at the height of the CCP’s international 
isolation, the PCI established partnerships with actors at home and abroad to 
never lose sight of China’s situation and to allow its ‘China policy’ blueprints to 
come to fruition. Last but not least was the goal of examining ways in which the 
PCI-CCP rapprochement, rather than being a product of Aldo Moro’s or Enrico 
Berlinguer’s efforts alone, was made possible by the actions of a number of PCI-
affiliated intellectuals and reporters that interacted with CCP officials at a time 
when the CCP had started to appreciate the value of the PCI’s ‘intermediate 
position’.  
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